Review:
"The most useful and important book ever written for aspiring leaders."
--Toronto Sun Times

Language Notes
Text: English (translation)
Original Language: Chinese--This text refers to an out of print or unavailableedition of this title.

From the Inside Flap
Helps the reader apply the principles of military strategy to all challenges andconflicts of life.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
I: LAYING PLANS

Sun Tzu said:

The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of lifeand death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence under no circumstances canit be neglected.

The art of war is governed by five constant factors, all of which need to betaken into account. They are: the Moral Law; Heaven; Earth; the Commander;Method and discipline.

The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, sothat they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.

Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open groundand narrow passes; the chances of life and death.

The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence,courage, and strictness.

By Method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army inits proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, themaintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control ofmilitary expenditure.

These five factors should be familiar to every general. He who knows themwill be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.

Therefore, when seeking to determine your military conditions, make yourdecisions on the basis of a comparison in this wise:

Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral Law?

Which of the two generals has the most ability?

With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?

On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts'ao Ts'ao (A.D. I55 - 220), who wassuch a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his own severeregulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned himself to death forhaving allowed his horse to stray into a field of corn! However, in lieu oflosing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by cutting offhis hair. "When you lay down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it isdisobeyed, the offender must be put to death."
Which army is the stronger?

On which side are officers and men more highly trained?

In which army is there the most absolute certainty that merit will beproperly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?

By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat. Thegeneral who hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it will conquer--let such a onebe retained in command! The general who hearkens not to my counsel nor acts uponit will suffer defeat--let such a one be dismissed! But remember: While heedingthe profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances overand beyond the ordinary rules and modify your plans accordingly.

All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seemunable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we mustmake the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believewe are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superiorstrength, evade him. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritatehim. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking his ease,give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where heis unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple beforethe battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculationsbeforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations todefeat; how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this pointthat I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

II: ON WAGING WAR

In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swiftchariots, ten thousand heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-cladsoldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li*, the expenditureat home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such asglue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of athousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of ahundred thousand men.

When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men'sweapons will grow dull and their ardor will be dampened. If you lay siege to atown, you will exhaust your strength, and if the campaign is protracted, theresources of the state will not be equal to the strain. Never forget: When yourweapons are dulled, your ardor dampened, your strength exhausted, and yourtreasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of yourextremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequencesthat must ensue.

Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never beenseen associated with long delays. In all history, there is no instance of acountry having benefited from prolonged warfare. Only one who knows thedisastrous effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidityin bringing it to a close. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with theevils of war who can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

The skillful general does not raise a second levy, neither are his supplywagons loaded more than twice. Once war is declared, he will not waste precioustime in waiting for reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for freshsupplies, but crosses the enemy's frontier without delay. The value oftime--that is, being a little ahead of your opponent--has counted for more thaneither numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard tocommissariat.

Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the armywill have food enough for its needs. Poverty of the state exchequer causes anarmy to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintainan army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.

On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and highprices cause people's substance to be drained away. When their substance isdrained away, they will be afflicted by heavy exactions. With this loss ofsubstance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be strippedbare, and their incomes dissipated; at the same time government expenses forbroken chariots, worn-out horses, breastplates and helmets, bows and arrows,spears and shields, protective mantlets, draught oxen and heavy wagons, willamount to almost half its total revenue.

A wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of theenemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a singlepicul** of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.

Now, in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger. For them toperceive the advantage of defeating the enemy, they must also have theirrewards. Thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used asrewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his ownaccount.

Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken,those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substitutedfor those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction withours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. This is calledusing the conquered foe to augment one's own strength.

In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. Thusit may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate,the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

* 2.78 modern li make a mile. The length may have varied slightly since SunTzu's time.

** A Chinese unit of weight equal to 133.33 pounds.

III: THE SHEATHED SWORD

To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supremeexcellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. In thepractical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country wholeand intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better tocapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment,or a company entire than to destroy them.

Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the nextbest is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is toattack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiegewalled cities, because the preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, andvarious implements of war will take up three whole months; and the piling up ofmounds over against the walls will take three months more. The general, unableto control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarmingants, with the result that one third of his men are slain, while the town stillremains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.

The skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; hecaptures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdomwithout lengthy operations in the field. With his forces intact he disputes themastery of the empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph is complete.

This is the method of attacking by stratagem of using the sheathed sword.

It is the rule in war: If our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surroundhim; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our armyinto two, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if hereplies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearwardattack, he may be crushed in front.

If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, wecan avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. Thoughan obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be capturedby the larger force.

The general is the bulwark of the state: if the bulwark is strong at allpoints, the state will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the state will beweak.

There are three ways in which a sovereign can bring misfortune upon his army:

By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the factthat it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.

By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom,being ignorant of the conditions that obtain in an army.

This causes restlessness in the soldiers' minds. Humanity and justice are theprinciples on which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism andflexibility, on the other hand, are military rather than civic virtues.

By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, throughignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakesthe confidence of the soldiers.
Su-ma Ch'ien about 100 B.C. added to this section: If a general is ignorant ofthe principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted with a position ofauthority. The skillful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man,the covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishinghis merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the covetous manis quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has no fear of death.
When the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from theother feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, andflinging victory away. Thus we may know that there are five essentials forvictory:

He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.

He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.

He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all itsranks.

He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.

He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by thesovereign.

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of ahundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victorygained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy noryourself, you will succumb in every battle.